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In 1990, 1.95 billion people in the world lived in extreme poverty; in 2012 the number
had dropped to 896 million.1 Brazil, India, China and South Africa are responsible for
much of this drastic reduction in global poverty and for the achievement of the first
Millennium Development Goal:2 collectively, these four countries lifted nearly 800
million people out of extreme poverty.3
That occurred, in part, because of economic growth, but social programmes also
played a major role. The articles in this special issue look at the political and policy
processes that accompanied the emergence of a stronger, less incomplete and more
inclusive welfare state in the four countries. This contributed substantially to the
marked reduction in income poverty and, equally importantly, to improvements in a
number of human development indicators.
This article has a more limited ambition. It will first offer a brief overview of the
types of programmes that were introduced or expanded in the four countries aimed at
tackling poverty and/or inequality. It will then proceed to examine the economic
context in which the expansion of those programmes in the four countries has taken
place. It will also assess headway made by the governments of Brazil, India, China
and South Africa in pursuing three goals: i) reducing income poverty; ii) reaching the
poorest of the poor; and iii) reducing inequality. As we will see, outcomes vary as we
move up the ladder from the first and least difficult difficult of these three challenges
to the third and most daunting where only Brazil has made substantive progress. In
the final section, broadening our definition of poverty to include not only a severe
shortage of incomes and wealth, but also a lack of opportunities, liberties and
capabilities, we will discuss how the four countries performed in ameliorating a
number of human development indicators and in enhancing poor people’s ‘political
capacity’, which is an important dimension of their poverty.
Expanding social programmes: an overview
The initiatives either introduced or expanded in the four countries belong to three
broadly defined types. The first is a set of social assistance programmes. Conditional
cash transfers were an important type of social assistance in Brazil, where a number
of existing cash transfer schemes were restructured and unified in the Bolsa Familia
programme, which provides an income to poor families if they respect certain
conditions such as vaccinating their children and sending them to school. In China,
the government scaled up the Dibao programme nationally which provides an
additional income to households earning less than a certain threshold. In South Africa,
the government has substantially expanded a number of cash transfer programmes,
particularly targeting children and the elderly. Finally, India has introduced a cash
transfer scheme for pregnant women within the National Food Security Act and it has
1 This is based on the recently revised World Bank’s poverty line at 1.90 USD/day at 2011 PPP.
2 The first MDG was to halve the number of people living in extreme poverty by 2015.
3 Authors’ calculation based on data taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI).
3expanded the coverage of a number of non-contributory pension schemes, particularly
for the disabled, the elderly and widows. Other types of transfers include India’s Food
Security Act and China’s tax-for-fee initiative. The former was introduced in 2013
and provides highly subsidised food to 67 per cent of the population through the
Public Distribution System. The latter effectively abolished taxes for rural dwellers,
where the majority of the poor live.
Another form of social assistance programmes moved beyond pure income transfer to
support broader human, financial or physical asset accumulation. Barrientos (2013)
defines these as ‘transfers combined with asset accumulation.’ These programmes
include two important workfare programmes, India’s Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act and South Africa’s Community Work Programme.
Whereas the India’s scheme is much broader, both programmes provide work
opportunities to the rural population.
The second type of anti-poverty initiative is the expansion of the health sectors. In
Brazil, the government has strengthened the Unified Health System (SUS) which
provides universal healthcare to all its citizens. China has tried to reverse the trend
seen during the 1990s, when a marked retreat of the state from social assistance
provision had left many out of the public health care system. The government thus
introduced the New Rural Cooperative Medical Scheme with the aim of providing
basic health coverage to China’s rural population. This has been supplemented by a
number of initiatives to provide basic public services to rural migrants to the cities.
India has also introduced a programme that increased health care coverage in rural
areas through the National Rural Health Mission and through the strengthening and
expansion of the Integrated Child Development Services, a programme aimed at
tackling child malnutrition in India. South Africa has also discussed the possibility of
introducing a universal health care system, but this is still at an embryonic stage.
The macroeconomic environment
Brazil, India, China and South Africa are the main protagonists of our global poverty
reduction story. Table 1 shows the scale of poverty reduction across the four countries
using the World Bank poverty line. Of course, as any poverty line, this is somewhat
arbitrary and does not necessarily capture the extent of poverty in any given country.
However, its comparability across countries and time, makes it a useful indicator to
understand trends and the extent of poverty reduction which occurred.4 The table
clearly shows that extreme poverty5 was reduced substantially over the last quarter
century in all four countries. This, of course, has much to do with economic growth.
Table 2 shows the average annual rates of growth of the GDP in the four countries,
including in per capita terms.
4 This is not the place to discuss the limitations of this rather crude way of measuring income poverty.
Suffice it to say that, for example, India has recently decided to provide highly subsidised food through
the National Food Security Act (2013) to 67 per cent of the population, thus implicitly recognising the
inadequacy of a poverty line that identifies only 21 per cent of its population as poor. See Ravallion
(2016, ch. 4) for a review of the debates around the poverty line(s).
5 As per the new international poverty line at 1.90$/day.
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The GDP figures neatly divide our four cases into two groups. China and India
experienced spectacular rates of economic growth (also in per capita terms), while in
Brazil and South Africa growth was much more modest, and disappointing in per
capita terms. This, and a large and growing body of evidence (World Bank 2014;
Ravallion 2016), indicate that economic growth is important for poverty reduction –
indeed crucial (Rodrik 2008). But it is just part of the story (despite what trickle-
down economists have argued for a long time): as Barrientos (2013) and others have
shown, social programmes and poverty-reduction schemes do matter.
It should be noted that, however important the quantity of economic growth is for
poverty reduction, its quality is crucial too. In fact, it is now widely accepted that
growth does not automatically trickle-down to the poor and that concentration of
income at the top of the socio-economic scale can actually constrain economic growth
(IMF 2015a). Studies that have assessed the extent to which growth has been pro-poor
in the four countries conclude that Brazil has been very successful at transforming
economic growth into poverty reduction. China’s performance has also been
remarkable. India and South Africa, however, were considerably less effective (Fosu
2011; Ravallion 2011).
The quality of economic growth for poverty reduction is important for at least four
reasons. First, the more growth is evenly distributed across regions within any given
country, the more robust are the effects in terms of poverty reduction (Chaudhuri and
Ravallion 2006). Second, growth will be more effective at reducing poverty if it is
concentrated where the majority of the poor live. For example, in a predominantly
rural society like China in the 1980s, exceptional growth rates in the primary sector in
the wake of the introduction of the household responsibility system reduced poverty
spectacularly (Bardhan 2010). On the other hand, the excruciatingly low rate of
growth in agriculture in India since the 1990s has significantly reduced the impact of
growth on poverty, especially because the manufacturing sector has been unable to
create enough jobs (Siddiqui 2015).
Third, the context matters. Generally speaking, high inequality reduces the impact of
economic growth on poverty reduction (Ravallion 2016). This is probably the main
reason behind the weak performance of South Africa – one of the most unequal
countries in the world. However, in Brazil (another highly unequal country) high
levels of inequality also meant that the government had significant revenues that
could be redistributed (Ravallion 2011). Brazil has a revenue-to-GDP ratio that is
comparable to that of the OECD economies (see table 3 below). High human
development indicators and relatively low inequality in China meant that the poor
were healthy and skilled enough to profit from China’s spectacular economic growth
(Ranis & Ramirez 2000). Conversely, low literacy rates and poor health indicators in
India constrained both economic growth and poverty reduction (Ravallion 2002). In
all cases, moreover, it was crucial that growth occurred in a rather stable
macroeconomic environment. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in Brazil,
where the stabilisation of the currency (the Real) was crucial both for promoting
growth and for reducing poverty (Melo, Ng’ethe and Manor 2012).
5Fourth, growth is important per se, but is also important because it results in increased
revenues that can be redistributed. Table 3 shows the trend in revenue generation
across the four countries (as a percentage of the GDP).
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Beside China’s exceptional figure, the growth of revenues elsewhere might not look
so spectacular. However, in absolute terms, between 2002 and 2012, the resources
available to the four governments increased by 171 per cent in Brazil; 197 per cent in
South Africa; 300 per cent in India; and 588 per cent in China.6
Distributing the proceeds of growth
The increase in revenues meant that the four governments had substantial resources to
spend. Some of these revenues were used to increase allocations both to essential
public services like health and education (which particularly benefit the poor) and a
range of policy initiatives to tackle poverty and inequality (along with the
continuation of policies favouring the middle classes, including labour ‘aristocracies’
in the formal sector). In this section, we look at patterns in social expenditure across
the four countries. Investments in essential public services are crucial for alleviating
poverty, fostering poor people’s capabilities, promoting economic growth and hence
for reducing poverty further.
All four countries increased public spending on health between 20 (Brazil) and 81 per
cent (China), as Table 4 shows. Of the four, however, India has an extremely low
figure for public heath expenditure. This is matched by India’s very high (but
declining) figure for out-of-pocket health expenditure (Table 5). It should be
remembered that healthcare costs are the single most important reason why people
(re)descend into, or remain trapped in, poverty (Krishna 2010). Thus out-of-pocket
expenditure is an extremely important indicator as it captures the money that
households directly spend for their healthcare and can therefore be used as a proxy for
people’s health insecurity. The figure for India is almost ten times higher than South
Africa’s and twice as high China’s. The general trend, however, is encouraging.
INSERT TABLE 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE
When we turn to education, all countries, barring India, increased expenditure on
public education as Table 6 shows. China in particular stands out for its increased
commitment to public education, which increased by over 100 per cent, although it
still lags behind Brazil and South Africa and remains at a low level. Overall, as Table
7 sets out, the combined expenditure on health and education increased substantially
in China, Brazil and South Africa. In India, however, it decreased from an already
low level.
INSERT TABLE 6 AND 7 HERE
6 Authors’ calculation on the basis of the data taken from IMF 2015b.
6The next section considers government initiatives to benefit poor people more
directly: social assistance programmes and poverty reduction schemes. These are
immensely important because despite the drastic reduction of poverty witnessed in
recent years, a sizable part of the population in the four countries still live on the edge
of poverty (see Figure 1). As figure 1 shows, nearly 80 per cent of the population of
India, more than 50 per cent of South Africa’s, almost 40 per cent China’s, and about
17 per cent of Brazil’s still live in poverty (below 3.10 USD/day) or extreme poverty
(below 1.90 USD/day). In this context, it is clear that the role of the state is crucial for
providing safety nets and support systems not only aimed at lifting people out of
poverty, but also at preventing them falling back into it. Globally, 11 per cent of
today’s poor are people who descended into poverty during their lifetime (Krishna
2010).
Figure 1 – Percentage of the population living in poverty (3.10 USD/day) and extreme
poverty (1.90 USD/day).
FIGURE 1 HERE
Source: WDI. All data are from 2011 except for China (2010).
Policy initiatives are important for reducing poverty and (less often) inequality
(Barrientos 2011). India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Act (MGNREGA), for example, is credited with an overall poverty reduction of 32
per cent and for preventing 14 million people from falling into poverty (Desai,
Vashishtha and Joshi 2015). Brazil’s Bolsa Familia alone was responsible for 21 per
cent of the fall in inequality (Soares, Ribas, Osorio 2010). South Africa’s cash
transfer programmes have also been important for poverty reduction (Barrientos and
DeJong 2006).
Table 8 below shows social assistance expenditure trends across the four countries.
This is a rough indicator of spending on anti-poverty initiatives, social safety nets and
other forms of support to the poor. However, the data is not strictly comparable across
countries. To the best of our knowledge, there is no reliable data available on social
protection expenditure for all our four countries across time. Hence it is necessary to
take data from different sources, which impedes comparability. It should be noted that
even data taken from a single source like the World Bank or the ILO are difficult to
compare and rely on.7 Even data taken from national budgets is not comparable as
each country defines social protection/assistance differently. But if we consider the
broad patterns that emerge, it is possible to draw cautious conclusions about trends
7 The World Bank’s ASPIRE database has data for a single year for the four countries; but the dataset’s
reliability is questionable. For example, the figure for India for total social expenditure is 0.7 per cent
of GDP in 2014. However, three programmes alone (the MGNREGA, the Midday Meal Scheme and
the Integrated Child Development Services) account for more than that amount. The ILO’s SECSOC
database does not include data for India and includes health expenditure in South Africa and pension
expenditure in Brazil (which is a highly regressive form of social security in Brazil, as it benefits the
better offs). IFPRI’s SPEED figures are highly questionable too. See also Barrientos (2013, p. 168 and
ff. for a discussion of these issues).
7over time: thus Table 8 shows that all four countries increased social expenditure,
however defined.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Overall, it is safe to conclude that all four countries were able to distribute (at least
partially) the fruits of economic growth, to reduce income poverty and to prevent
some non-poor from descending back into poverty. The policy efforts involved
differed by country. The Chinese government has introduced fewer programmes that
explicitly seek – as their main aim -- to reduce poverty. But some of its initiatives
which for the most part focus on related goals (for example, ending taxation on rural
incomes, and the effort to address needs in less developed western provinces) have
had a poverty-reducing impact. Moreover, China’s increasing commitment to
essential public services – expenditure on health and education increased by over 80
per cent as a proportion of GDP between 1999 and 2012 – indicates that a significant
number of poor people benefited at least partially from China’s growth story.
In India, some poverty programmes have been weakened by poor formulation and/or
implementation. This reminds us that while increased social expenditure often reduces
poverty, this does not always occur. But at least some of them – the MGNREGA and
the Midday Meal scheme, above all – had a substantial impact on the welfare of the
poor. Furthermore, the evidence on household incomes set out in the next section
from an authoritative survey by India’s National Council of Applied Economic
Research (NCAER) and the University of Maryland plainly indicates that its bundle
of poverty initiatives have had a significant effect on reducing poverty. India’s
commitments to essential public services, however, remain low – and declining – and
they disproportionately affect the poor, who cannot afford decent-quality private
alternatives. Indeed, the neglect of public services has a long history in India. Kapur
and Nangia (2015) convincingly argue that when India’s policy-makers are faced with
the choice of investing limited state resources in either public services or poverty-
reduction programmes, they tend to choose the latter. This might have something to
do with the prominent role of patronage in South Asia (Piliavsky 2014) and with an
increasingly competitive party system, which provides incentives to politicians to
distribute tangible and immediate goods to the poor, rather than investing in longer-
term development through public services. Despite this, many Indian politicians at
national and state levels have increasingly stressed ‘post-clientelist’ initiatives which
are largely protected from those involved in patronage distribution – because their
developmental impact and the political pay-offs that ensue are greater (Manor 2013
and 2016).
In South Africa, the expansion of cash transfer programmes has benefited the poor
significantly as has the increased commitment to public education and health. Jeremy
Seekings (2011) attributes the decline of income poverty primarily to the expansion of
social assistance and notes that expenditure on poverty reduction policies increased
sharply, from about 2 per cent of GDP in 2000 to 3.5 per cent, in 2006. Hence, in
South Africa too, the poor at least partially benefited from distributive policies.
The evidence from Brazil is more straightforward. Of the four cases, it is clearest that
its various initiatives have patently had a potent redistributive effect, and have
8reduced income poverty and inequality. This is largely the result of a long-term
commitment by successive Brazilian governments to reduce poverty and inequality
(Melo, Ng’ethe and Manor 2012) and to public opinion that largely supports higher
spending on both poverty reduction policies and public services (Hall 2006; see also
Pereira and Bartholini in this special issue).
Reaching the poorest
It is well understood that it is exceedingly difficult for poverty initiatives to reach the
poorest of the poor. Over the last half-century, many programmes across the
developing world which have benefited some – or many – poor people have had little
impact on the most destitute. They are extremely vulnerable, largely bereft of
capabilities, and locked into invidious bonds of dependency upon prosperous groups.
They usually suffer extreme discrimination and exclusion, which are often socio-
cultural in origin. They stand at what Milton called “the utmost edge of hazard”.
The literature has highlighted how the poorest are sometimes left out of development
programmes by design because they lack the ‘potential’ to escape poverty (Halder &
Mosley 2004). At other times they are ‘invisible’ to the state because, for example,
they do not have an address, or because they live in dangerous areas where surveyors
tasked with the identification of beneficiaries are not willing to venture (Carr-Hill,
2013). A further reason is that the poorest of the poor suffer from a severe shortage of
capabilities (especially education) that make access to social protection programmes
even more difficult. In other words, reaching the poorest of the poor requires targeting
this group specifically and with specific tools that countries and donors often do not
have the capacity (or willingness) to adopt (Datta 2004).
It is difficult to say with certainty to what extent social programmes in Brazil, India,
China and South Africa reached the poorest, partly because of a lack of impact studies
focusing on the most destitute sections of populations and partly because many social
programmes target specific sections of the poor (the elderly, children, women, rural
unemployed etc.) which may or may not be (or include many of) the poorest of the
poor.
We can, however, get at least a rough idea of the extent to which the neediest were
reached. In China, where the evidence is limited, some of the poorest will surely have
benefited – at least modestly – from policies that mainly reached other, less destitute
sections of ‘the poor’. For example, when taxation on rural incomes was ended in
2006, the plight of the poorest villagers was eased to at least a limited extent. Rural
taxes in China were highly regressive. According to Li and Sicular (2014), in 1995
the tax rate of the poorest decile was five times higher than that of the highest decile.
Therefore, the abolition of taxes and fees for rural dwellers disproportionately
benefited the poorest. As a result, the scheme is credited with reducing inequalities
within villages (Alm and Liu 2014). The marked increase of subsidies for farmers
(22.5 per cent a year between 2003 and 2009), on the other hand, resulted in a rather
uneven distribution – the poorer the farmer, the lower the subsidy they received.
However, evidence shows that all farmers – including the poorest – were able to get
this form of support from the government (Lin & Wong, 2012).
9On a less positive note, the massive migration of Chinese rural dwellers into urban
centres in search of employment entailed not just entrepreneurial decisions by people
who were somewhat poor, but also desperate actions by those who were – in the
evocative words of a South African poverty campaigner – “well under”.8 In China’s
cities, work for the poorest was often very difficult to obtain, so that their prospects
did not necessarily improve; and, second, migrant workers could not – and, by and
large, still cannot – access basic public services like healthcare and education,
because of the persistence of the Hukou system.9 Policies recently introduced to
ameliorate the living conditions of migrant workers – many of whom who can be
safely classified as among the most vulnerable in China – did not have a significant
impact, as the great majority of them are still not covered by social security schemes
(Cook & Kabeer 2011, ch. 6).
Other policies in China similarly failed to reach the poorest. For example, the cash
transfer programme for the urban poor, Dibao, reached just 39 per cent of the urban
poor (Wang 2007; see also Golan, Sicular and Umapathi 2017), whereas its rural-
focussed counterpart had only a limited impact on poverty rates (Golan, Sicular &
Umapathi 2015). Also the introduction of the Labour Contract Law in 2008
disproportionately benefited urban rather than rural migrants (Cheng, Smyth & Guo
2015) and more educated rather than less educated workers (Gallagher, Giles, Park, &
Wang 2015).
The evidence from South Africa is again rather limited, but some non-trivial gains
appear to have been made. It is safe to assume that the programme to provide
employment on government-funded projects in rural areas where poverty is most
acute in that country, the Community Work Programme – modelled on the larger
Indian public works initiative – gave opportunities to some of the poorest (Andersson
and Alexander, forthcoming). But the scale of that initiative was limited and, despite
a promising start, the programme is now affected by a number of implementation
faults that limit its impact, including on the poorest (Meth 2011).
The introduction and expansion of social grants for vulnerable groups appears to have
had a much greater impact on the most destitute (urban and rural), so some significant
headway was made (Leibbrandt, Woolard, McEwen, & Koep 2010). Jeremy Seekings
(2011, p37) notes:
these social assistance programs had a major effect on poverty because
they were well targeted to the poor. …Almost 60 percent…went to
households in the poorest quintile. About 30 percent was shared between
households in the second and third income quintiles.
In Brazil, efforts to reach the poor, and the poorest, were much more long-standing,
substantial, comprehensive and effectively implemented than in the other three
countries. This has much to do with the excellent targeting of Brazil’s flagship
conditional cash transfer programme, Bolsa Familia. According to a World Bank
Study (Lindert, Linder, Hobbs & de la Brière, 2007, 46) the poorest 25 per cent of the
population receives 80% of all benefits and inclusion of non-poor among the
8 Interview by James Manor with an informant in Durban, 26 February 1998.
9 The Hukou system formally identifies a person as a resident of an area. That person will be allowed to
access public services only in the area where he/she resides.
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beneficiaries is virtually non-existent (Soares et al. 2010). There is also evidence that
the increased commitment of the government to universal public healthcare has
resulted in increased coverage. According to a recent study, 90 per cent of Brazilians
have now access to public health care (Gragnolati, Lindelow and Cuttolenc 2013).
This leaves India where many of the poverty-reduction initiatives were afflicted by
design faults and/or problems during implementation. However, the picture is not
entirely grim. The poorest made very substantial gains made under the largest Indian
programme, the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act
(MGNREGA). Consider, by way of illustration, the following figures on the social
groups which obtained employment from it. Many of the poorest rural dwellers (and
roughly two-thirds of Indians reside in rural areas) can be found in two such groups:
the Scheduled Castes (ex-untouchables or Dalits) and the Scheduled Tribes (adivasis).
INSERT TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE
These marginalised groups, and thus significant numbers of India’s poorest, gained
disproportionately from this huge programme. This provides much of the explanation
for the important, authoritative finding of the NCAER/University of Maryland study
that while per capita household incomes among high caste Hindus (the most
prosperous group) had increased by 4.6% per annum between 2004-05 and 2011-12,
significantly larger gains were made by all other categories. ‘Other Backward Castes’
(the lower-middle stratum in the traditional caste hierarchy) saw per capita incomes
increase by 7.3%; Scheduled Castes by 7.8%; Scheduled Tribes by 5.7%; and
Muslims by 5.4%.10 The last three of those groups include many of India’s poorest
people. (That same study found – rather surprisingly -- that in percentage terms,
household incomes in rural areas had increased more between 2004 and 2012 than
had urban household incomes.)
So some of the poorest were reached by government initiatives in China, a larger
proportion of them was reached in South Africa, and still larger proportions were
reached in Brazil and India. These are impressive achievements, but we must turn to
a further question, to which the answers are less encouraging.
Was inequality reduced?
If reaching the poorest is extremely difficult, reducing inequality – even when the
income poverty of many is eased – is even harder. This is apparent from evidence on
the countries that we have analysed.
For a telling example, consider the comments just above on India. Poorer groups
benefited disproportionately from the MGNREGA, and the NCAER/University of
Maryland findings indicate that all poorer groups saw greater increases in their
household incomes than did the richest. But this does not necessarily imply that
income inequality shrank. The increases in those household incomes are reported in
percentage terms. The most prosperous group may only have seen an annual increase
of 4.6% in their household incomes – less, sometimes far less than other poorer
10 Ibid., and The Hindu, 30 March and 5 April 2014.
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groups. But their incomes at the start were considerably greater than those of the
three groups that contain many of the poorest, so in absolute terms, an increase of
4.6% still enabled them to gain more than those poorer groups gained, despite the
differences in percentage terms. So inequalities in the funds available to these groups
appear to have widened, despite the greater gains of the poor in percentage terms.
Data shows that, among our four cases, only Brazil succeeded at reducing income
inequalities. Table 10 shows income inequality trends as measured by the Gini
coefficient. Of course, this is a rather crude measure of inequality. The Gini
coefficient is very sensitive to changes in income in the middle strata, and tends to
underestimate the changes at the extremes. In highly unequal countries like Brazil and
South Africa, this is a serious limitation. It also does not take into account
demographic changes: in a country like India that is experiencing a very rapid
increase in the working age population, or in a country like China that is aging fast,
this again constitutes a rather serious problem. The Gini coefficient is even more
imperfect when calculated for countries with a large informal economy (which is the
case in all of our four cases). Furthermore, since the Gini coefficient is a measure of
income inequality, it does not capture other forms of inequality: regional, educational,
urban-rural or socio-cultural, for example. Lastly, while most countries use income as
the key variable for measuring inequality, some (including India) use consumption
expenditure, which tends to artificially lower the Gini coefficient (Desai et al. 2010).
However, despite such limitations, the Gini coefficient does have the clear advantage
of being available for most countries and across time.
INSERT TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE
The table above shows that inequality has increased in all four countries barring
Brazil. It has been widely acknowledged that in recent years, income inequality there
has been reduced as a result of longer-standing efforts to tackle poverty and inequality
by successive governments since 1992. They were headed by three presidents from
two different progressive parties: Fernando Henrique Cardoso of the PSDB or
Brazilian Social Democratic Party , 1992-200, and from the PT or Workers’ Party,
Lula da Silva, 2000-08, and Dilma Rouseff, 2008-16. (On Cardoso, see Melo,
Ng’ethe and Manor, 2012, ch. 4). Multi-party politics mattered in India as well, but
strong efforts to tackle poverty and inequality only began there in 2004 – much later
than in Brazil – when the United Progressive Alliance led by the Congress Party took
power. Multi-party politics scarcely counted in South Africa where the African
National Congress was largely dominant until mid-2016, and it was absent in China.
The gains made in Brazil may now be reversed since Dilma Rouseff was forced to
resign in 2016 amid a corruption scandal and a severe economic downturn – to be
succeeded by leaders who have begun to undermine poverty programmes.
The last column in the table also shows how different India’s figure looks when
income is used as the basis for the calculation of the Gini (as opposed to consumption
expenditure, as in the third column). If we use consumption expenditure, India is a
moderately unequal country; if we use income, it is a highly unequal country, actually
more unequal than Brazil today. Other estimates of the income-based Gini for India
reach similar conclusions (IMF 2015b).
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A rather similar picture emerges from Credit Suisse’s Wealth Report (2015), that
provides the Gini coefficient of wealth and is thus a measure of how (un)equally
wealth is distributed in any given country. Table 11 provides the four countries’
figures. When looking at wealth, not even Brazil has succeeded in reducing wealth
inequality, which is even more difficult to do than reducing income inequality.
INSERT TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE
Finally, figures 2 and 3 show how the income (consumption, in the case of India) of
the top and bottom deciles of the spectrum has changed since the early 1990s. Two
points are particularly worth noting. First, the reduction of inequalities in Brazil is due
both to an increase of the share of income of the poorest 10 per cent of the population
– which is still very low at less than 1 per cent of the country’s total income – and to a
decrease of the share of the richest, which declined from 48.44 per cent in 1993 to
41.89 in 2010. This is a remarkable achievement, as pursuing a set of policies that
negatively affect the richest is something that most countries in the world have found
politically infeasible. China and South Africa, however, also succeeded (in the 2000s)
at reducing the share of income of the richest. Second, China has seen a drastic drop
in the income share of the poorest since the 1990s. A drop can be seen in India and
South Africa too, but is much less dramatic. As argued above, the poorest have indeed
been benefiting from social protection policies implemented by their governments;
but this has been barely enough to mitigate their poverty and certainly not enough to
ease their plight at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder.
Figure 2 – Income share of the bottom 10% 1993-2010/11
FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 3 - Income share of the top 10% 1993-2010/11
FIGURE 3 HERE
Source: World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Database.
So in summation, some of the proceeds of growth were distributed and income
poverty was reduced in all four of our countries: Brazil, India, China and South
Africa. The vexing difficulties of reaching the poorest were addressed to some degree
in China and to a greater extent in the other three countries. But the excruciatingly
difficult task of reducing inequality was successfully tackled only in Brazil.
Beyond incomes: further dimensions of poverty and inequality
The discussion in the previous sections focused on income poverty (and inequality).
But in this project, we have used a broad definition of ‘poverty’. It entails not just a
severe shortage of incomes, assets and funds, but also a severe shortage of
opportunities, liberties and capabilities. In this section we look at how some basic
human development indicators (mainly related to health and education) changed in
recent years in the four countries. In the final section we will discuss an especially
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important capability – ‘political capacity’ – a lack of which we consider to be an
important dimension of people’s poverty.
Table 12 provides a crude indicator of health in the four countries by looking at life
expectancy. Brazil and China’s figures are not yet on par with OECD members’
(80.1), but they are not far off it. India’s figure is on par with that of South Asia
(68.1), but lower than neighbouring and much poorer countries like Bangladesh (71.6)
and even Nepal (69.6). India’s figure in 2014 is worse than China’s in 1990 (69), but
as the table shows, it is making relatively rapid progress. South Africa’s life
expectancy is lower than that of the poorest area in the world, Sub-Saharan Africa
(58.6). This has much to do with the HIV-AIDS epidemics of the 1990s, from which
South Africa has not fully recovered yet (most Sub-Saharan African countries were
affected too). Life expectancy in South Africa has actually dropped from 62.1 in 1990
and it is now slowly recovering.
INSERT TABLE 12 ABOUT HERE
Life expectancy is strongly influenced by high mortality rates among children. Table
13 provides data for infant (below 1 year of age) and child (below 5) mortality rates.
As the table shows, all countries made significant progress, although the figures from
India and South Africa are still alarming. It is also significant that the rate of
reduction of both the infant and child mortality rates is slower than in China and in
Brazil, despite the fact that India and South Africa started from a rather low base.
High infant and child mortality rates are to a significant extent due to poor public
commitment to the welfare of the children as shown in Tables 14 and 15 which
provide immunisation and malnutrition (stunting) rates, respectively.
INSERT TABLE 13-15 HERE
Stunting is the most reliable indicator of a child’s well-being. Brazil and China almost
halved their already relatively low figures for children under five who are stunted,
whereas India and South Africa lag behind. In particular, India’s figure is higher than
that of most Sub-Saharan African countries. Children who suffer from malnutrition in
the first two years of their lives are irremediably stunted, both mentally and physically
(Gragnolati, Bredenkamp, Shekar, Das Gupta & Lee 2006). Their brains do not
develop fully, so they are left – permanently – with avoidably low mental capacity.
Physical stunting makes them weaker and more vulnerable to illnesses, which of
course undermines their capacity to sustain their livelihoods. So in both ways,
malnutrition limits the resources both of the poor people who suffer from it, and of
the nation in which they live. It compounds the problems of inequality which poor
people face.
The next tables turn to education indicators. Table 16 shows literacy trends across the
four countries. It shows that India is the only country that lags behind. However, the
situation is improving rapidly. Two bits of particularly good news are, first, the solid
achievements in India in terms of net enrolment rates to primary school – which
improved from 84.13 per cent in 2000 to 94.98 per cent in 2013. Second, the gender
gap in enrolment rates has been substantially reduced. 91.77 and 98.57 per cent of
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female and male children, respectively, are enrolled in schools today. The completion
rate is also high at 96 per cent (with no gender gap) (WDI). This certainly has much
to do with the universalisation of the Midday Meal scheme and the enactment of the
Right to Education Act in recent years. Enrolment rates are of course not an indication
of the quality of education, which is an extremely serious problem in India,
particularly in rural areas (ASER 2015).
INSERT TABLE 16 ABOUT HERE
Finally, Table 17 shows maternal mortality rates which provide a crude indication of
public commitment to the welfare of women. Here the story is similar to other
development indicators. India is the outlier as skilled staff attend only slightly more
than half of the births, which is reflected in the still very high rate of maternal deaths.
In South Africa, the extremely high rate is due to the HIV epidemic, which had
contributed to bring the rate to 400 per 100,000 live births by 2005. Both India and
South Africa missed the maternal-related Millennium Development Goals (Goal 5).
INSERT TABLE 17 ABOUT HERE
Political Capacity
We conclude our discussion with another especially important capability: ‘political
capacity’. It consists of four elements which for many poor people are in very short
supply: their political awareness (their understanding of local power dynamics and
political processes); their confidence as political actors in those processes and in the
public sphere; their political skills; and their political connections to other poor people
and to allies among the non-poor.
If a government initiative enables poor people to strengthen their political capacity, by
drawing them into the public sphere as proactive participants, then it has two effects --
as a poverty-reducing end in itself, and as a means to enable further poverty-reducing
gains. A severe lack of political capacity is one disabling dimension of poor people’s
‘poverty’ – many poor people are poor partly because they are bereft of political
capacity. So if their political capacity can be enhanced, that in itself erodes one
aspect of their poverty – as an end in itself. But when they acquire greater political
capacity, they also become better able to engage with grassroots political dynamics –
in contestation and/or collaboration. That may enable them to exert at least some
influence, and perhaps to make and then to defend material gains. That, in turn,
reduces (i) their dependence on elites, (ii) their poverty (when seen in material terms),
and (iii) invidious local inequalities. So the enhancement of political capacity can
also serve as a means to those ends.
Some of the poverty initiatives that we have studied in these four countries have had
this kind of enabling impact, but there are important variations. Several policies and
processes that have been introduced in Brazil since the mid-1990s have had an effect
here. The exercise in participatory budgeting which originated in Porto Alegre is one
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well known example (Santos 1998). Only one of the Indian initiatives that we have
analysed had a similar impact, but it was sufficiently massive that it made an
important difference. It thus deserves attention here – partly to explain how political
capacity might be enhanced, and partly because responses to it by Chinese and South
African policy makers are revealing.
The Indian programme in question is its rural employment guarantee scheme (the
MGNREGA). It was intended to provide poor rural dwellers with much needed
wages, but it did not merely entail the disbursal of money to the poor, as cash
transfers do. Such transfers certainly qualify as constructive poverty programmes,
and they have had a substantial impact (as we have seen above) in Brazil and South
Africa. But the beneficiaries in such programmes are largely passive recipients. The
MGNREGA was different. It gave every poor rural household the right to demand
and receive up to 100 days employment per year on construction sites. In other
words, poor villagers were enabled and incentivised to seek work proactively. The
aim was to draw them into the public sphere: when they demanded work, when they
performed labour on projects, and when they collected wages from their bank
accounts through which they were paid to combat pilfering.11
The architects of the MGNREGA knew that attempts would be made by unscrupulous
actors at and near the local level to steal funds from the programme and from
workers’ wages. They therefore introduced powerful transparency mechanisms to
impede such attempts, and to make them visible to poor villagers. They knew that
this would inspire discontent among the poor, but they welcomed that because
discontent would spur poor people to yet more proactive engagement in the public
sphere. In other words, one key aim of the MGNREGA was to enhance poor people’s
political awareness, confidence, skills and connections – their political capacity. The
programme tackled poverty in two ways: by giving the poor opportunities to earn
much needed wages, and by strengthening their capabilities. Massive numbers of
poor people responded, and the MGNREGA had a substantial impact on both
dimensions of their poverty.
After the programme had achieved considerable success in its early years, a team of
government analysts from China visited India for talks about development strategies.
It became apparent as discussions proceeded that the Chinese were only interested in
one Indian programme, the MGNREGA. But they made it clear that if China
developed something similar, it would not include the crucially important demand-
driven elements of the Indian programme, or the strong transparency mechanisms that
are key features of it. The delegates from Beijing plainly stated that a Chinese
counterpart would be a much more top-down operation dominated by agents of the
party-state. They preferred to avoid building political capacity.12
11 It had an especially strong impact on poor village women – who, in many parts of India, seldom left
their houses before the MGNREGA. They performed a substantial proportion of the work under that
programme – many millions of person-days -- which drew them into the public sphere where they
developed ties to other poor women. It also paid them wages in their own names which often gave
them a degree of material autonomy within their households. One team of field researchers found that
domestic violence had decreased after women had worked under the MGNREGA. These issues are
discussed in much greater detail in Jenkins and Manor (2017).
12 These comments are based on interviews by James Manor with two Indian officials who took part
in the talks, New Delhi, 7 August 2012.
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After the MGNREGA had shown early promise, the South African government
decided to introduce an adaptation of it in rural areas where poverty is more acute
than in urban areas, and where jobs are extremely scarce. But their programme
differed from the Indian version in one important respect. The key implementing
agencies at the grassroots in India are elected local councils which provide arenas for
political contestation and the strengthening of poor people’s political capacity. In
South Africa, however, local councils created in 2000 have been crippled by
excessive top-down bureaucratic control and technocratic overload, as a result of elite
distrust of the rustics elected to them (see Siddle and Koelble 2012). So they cannot
play such a role there. This forced policy makers to turn to civil society
organisations, which are well versed in participatory methods, as the main promoters
of the programme. They have done good work, but this arrangement impedes the
development of poor people’s political capacity on a scale seen in India’s
MGNREGA or in some Brazilian initiatives.13
To reiterate: a severe shortage of political capacity is an important dimension of poor
people’s poverty. In China, that dimension has been left unaddressed because
political leaders who influence poverty initiatives prefer to avoid that. In the same
vein, it is notable that an early Chinese experiment with elections of officials at the
township level – the lowest level at which executive power is exercised – has been
abandoned. In South Africa, the weakness of elected local councils has forced policy
makers to turn to civil society organisations which have responded well but which
cannot provide arenas for local democratic contestation of the kind that are found in
India (and Brazil). So the impact on poor people’s political capacity is and will
remain less strong there.
Conclusion
Since 2002 or so, governments in Brazil, India, China and South Africa have adopted
new initiatives – or intensified older efforts – to pursue three goals: reducing income
poverty; reaching the poorest of the poor; and reducing income inequality. The
outcomes have varied from country to country, and from programme to programme.
Significant headway has been made in all four countries in tackling the first and
easiest of these challenges, and (more remarkably) the second and more daunting
problem. The third, reducing income inequality, is far more difficult. Only Brazil has
succeeded there.
This analysis has also looked beyond income poverty and inequality by considering
another important set of problems which poor people face: a severe lack of
opportunities, liberties and capabilities. We have examined efforts by these
governments to address these things – by improving human development indicators
linked to their opportunities and capabilities (nutrition, health care, literacy, etc.), and
by enhancing their ‘political capacity’ -- so that they are better able, proactively, to
pursue and defend their interests.
13 This paragraph draws on James Manor’s discussions of the workings of the MGNREGA with South
African officials as they developed their plans for a rural employment programme.
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Somewhat different strategies, different types of government initiatives, have been
used in the four countries. Some have been more effective than others, but all have
had some impact. The discussion of these variations indicates the breadth of the
menu of feasible, promising options available to policy makers who might wish to
tackle poverty and inequality.
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Table 1 – Poverty reduction in Brazil, India, China and South Africa 1990-2012
% pop below
1.90$/day
1990s
% pop below
1.90$/day
2010s
Percentage
reduction 1990s-
2010s
Percentage
reduction 2002-
10s
Brazil 20.56 4.59 77.68% 62.71%
China 66.58 11.18 83.21% 65.01%
India 46.06 21.25 53.86% 44.66%
South
Africa
31.91 16.56 48.10% 52.95%
Source: World Development Indicators (WDI). Brazil’s data are from 1990 and 2012; China: 1990 and
2010: India: 1993 and 2011; South Africa: 1993 and 2011.
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Table 2 – GDP and per capita GDP growth 1990-2014
Average
annual GDP
Growth 1990-
2014
Average annual
GDP growth
2002-14
Average per
capita GDP
growth 1990-
2014
Average per
capita GDP
growth 2002-
14
Brazil 2.77 3.43 1.41 2.29
China 9.84 9.93 8.97 9.33
India 6.51 7.42 4.75 5.86
South Africa 2.48 3.18 0.66 1.72
Source: Authors’ calculation based on WDI .
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Table 3 – Revenue growth as percentage of GDP
General Government Revenue (% GDP)
2002 2012
Brazil 34.44 35.41
China 15.69 28.36
India 17.73 19.72
South Africa 23.75 27.21
OECD 34.34 35.46
Source: IMF 2015b
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Table 4 – Public and private expenditure on health as a proportion of GDP
2002 2014
Public Private Total Public Private Total
Brazil 3.18 3.9 7.1 3.83 4.5 8.3
India 1.03 3.4 4.4 1.41 3.3 4.7
China 1.71 3.1 4.8 3.10 2.5 5.5
South Africa 3.23 4.6 8.1 4.24 4.9 8.8
Source: WDI. Public health expenditure consists of recurrent and capital spending from government
(central and local) budgets, external borrowings and grants (including donations from international
agencies and nongovernmental organizations), and social (or compulsory) health insurance funds.
Private health expenditure includes direct household (out-of-pocket) spending, private insurance,
charitable donations, and direct service payments by private corporations. Total health expenditure is
the sum of public and private health expenditure. It covers the provision of health services (preventive
and curative), family planning activities, nutrition activities, and emergency aid designated for health
but does not include provision of water and sanitation.
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Table 5 – Out-of-pocket Health Expenditure as a proportion of total health
expenditure
2002 2014
Brazil 34.61 25.47
India 70.50 62.42
China 57.72 31.99
South Africa 11.70 6.49
Source: WDI
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Table 6 – Public expenditure on education as a proportion of GDP
1999 2012
Brazil 3.78 5.91
India 4.34 3.82
China 1.90 3.91*
South Africa 5.88 6.36
Source: WDI. *The data for China in 2012 are based on the authors’ calculation on
the basis of the figures taken from the China Statistical Yearbook 2014.
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Table 7 – Combined health and education public expenditure as a proportion of the
GDP
1999 2012 Change
Brazil 6.73 9.57 +42.2%
India 5.47 5 -8.6%
China 3.73 6.85* +83.6%
South Africa 9.3 10.63 +14.3%
Source: WDI. *The education component of the China figure in 2012 is calculated by
the authors on the basis of the figures taken from the China Statistical Yearbook 2014.
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Table 8 – Social expenditure ca. 2005 - ca. 2010
Country 2005 2010
Brazil 0.83 1.09
India 0.4 1.5
China 4.9 5.4
South Africa 3.6 4.4
Sources: For India and China: Asian Development Bank: Social protection Index Database. For Brazil:
Castro, Ribeiro, Chaves & Duarte 2012. For South Africa: Reserve Bank of South Africa database.
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Table 9 - Percentages of total person-days worked
Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes
Share of person-days, 2006-08 25-31% 24-36%
Share of person-days, 2008-12 28.8% 21.3%
Share of population 16.2% 8.2%
Source: MGNREGA website: nrega.nic.in, ‘DMU reports’.14
14 This is discussed in much greater detail in chapters six and eight of Jenkins and Manor (2017).
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Table 10 - Gini coefficient 1993-2009/13
1993
Most recent data
(2009/13)
Most recent data with
income-based Gini for India
Brazil 60.12 52.67 52.67
India 30.82 33.9 52.7*
China 35.5 42.06 42.06
South Africa 59.33 63.38 63.38
Sources: WDI. Brazil’s most recent data: 2013; India: 2009; China: 2010; South Africa: 2011. *This
figure comes from the Indian Human Development Survey (Desai et al. 2010). That figure differs
from the figures in column two of the table because it is based on income while the figures in column
two are based on consumption.
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Table 11 - Wealth Inequality (Gini of wealth inequality) 2010-15
2010 2015
Brazil 79.6 83
India 77.8 83.1
China 69 73.3
South Africa 81.6 84
Source: Credit Suisse 2015
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Table 12 – Life expectancy at birth
Life expectancy at birth (years)
2000 2014
Total Female Total Female
Brazil 70 73.9 74.4 78.2
China 71.7 73.4 75.8 77.3
India 62.6 63.5 68 69.5
South Africa 55.8 58 57.2 59.3
Source: WDI
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TABLE 13 – IMR and CMR 2000-14
Infant Mortality Rate
(per 1,000 live births)
%
Change
Child Mortality Rate
(per 1,000 live births)
%
Change
2000 2014 2000-14 2000 2014 2000-14
Brazil 28.1 14.4 - 48.75 32 16.2 - 49.38
China 30.2 9.8 - 67.55 36.9 11.4 - 69.11
India 66.4 39.3 - 40.81 91.2 49.8 - 45.39
South Africa 54 34.4 - 36.30 75.3 43.4 - 42.36
Source: WDI
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Table 14 – Immunisation rates
Country Immunization rates (% children 12-23 months)
DPT Measles
2000 2013 2000 2013
Brazil 98 95 99 99
China 85 99 84 99
India 60 72 59 74
South
Africa 73 68 72 79
Source: WDI
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Table 15 – Stunting rates
Year % Children under 5
who are stunted
Brazil 1996 13.5
2006 7.1
China 2000 17.8
2010 9.4
India 1998 54.2
2005 47.9
2013 38.7*
South Africa 1999 30.1
2008 23.9
Source: WHO-UNICEF-World Bank dataset. *This is based on UNICEF’s Rapid Survey on Children.
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Table 16 – Literacy and youth literacy rates
Country Year Literacy rates (% people
above 15)
Youth literacy rates (% of people
15-24)
Female Male Total Female Male Total
Brazil 2000 86.5 86.23 86.37 95.72 92.65 94.18
2012 91.63 91.02 91.33 99.02 98.22 98.62
China 2000 86.53 95.14 90.92 98.50 99.20 98.86
2010 92.71 97.48 95.12 99.59 99.69 99.64
India 2001 47.84 73.41 61.01 67.75 84.19 76.43
2011* 65.46 82.14 74.04 81.8 90 86.1
South
Africa
1996 80.93 84.07 82.40 94.29 93.50 93.91
2012 92.59 94.96 93.73 99.27 98.50 98.99
Source: WDI. * 2011 data for India are taken from the 2011 census.
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Table 17 Maternal mortality rates
Maternal mortality rate (per
100,000 live births)
Births attended by skilled health
staff (%)
2003 2012-13
Around 2000* Most recent
data**
Brazil 72 58.2 96.5 98.1
China 51 23.2 96.6 99.9
India 301 170 42.5 52.3
South Africa 165.5 200 84.4 94.3
Source: WDI. * Data for Brazil: 2001; China and India: 2000; South Africa: 1998. ** Brazil: 2012;
China: 2013; India and South Africa: 2008
